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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROOSENDAAL CONSTRUCTION
MINING CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant

&

vs.

VERNON L. HOLMAN, Chairman of
Utah State Tax Commission; PAUL T.
FORDHAM; G. DOUGLAS TAYLOR and
R. MILTON YORGASON, Commissioners
of the Utah State Tax Commission; THE
STATE OF UTAH; STATE TAX
COMMISSION OF UTAH, and
NORMAN DANIELS,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.

12504

Brief of Defendants-Respondents
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action filed by the plaintiff who alleges a
"wrongful taking, impounding and confiscation of plaintiff's
vehicle, and the arbitrary cancellation of plaintiff's special fuel
permit," ( R. 6) by the defendants. The plaintiff prays for
$25,000 general damages and $100,000 punitjve damages
against the defendant, Norman Daniels, and for $25,000 general damages and $100,000 punitive damages against the defendant Tax Commissioners.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After defendants filed certain Affidavits along with their
Motion to Dismiss, Judge D. Frank Wilkins granted said
Motion to Dismiss for all five reasons alleged in the Motion
to Dismiss filed by the defendants. ( R. 69-7 0) . Those reasons
were, as follows:
"1. The complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

"2. The corporate powers of plaintiff corporation have been suspended by the Utah Secretary of
State under the provisions of Section 59-13-61, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, which suspends all of the
powers, rights and privileges of said corporation; and
one of the powers, rights and privileges thereby suspended, and which was suspended upon the day the
above entitled action was filed, is the right to bring
lawsuits in the courts of the State of Utah.
"3. The acts complained of fall within Section
63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and are immune from private suit for injuries, both as to all of the
defendants individually and collectively.
"4. That the effect of governmental immunity
cannot be circumvented by suing the individuals in
their private capacity.
"5. That the questions and issues raised in the
complaint are moot because plaintiff corporation had
filed, at the time said motion was heard, the required
bond with the defendant, Utah State Tax Commission,
and defendants had released each and every vehicle
which had been impounded at the time said complaint
was filed."
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Order of the lower
court, and the defendants ask that the Order of Judge D. Frank
Wilkins be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Motion to Dismiss, which was granted by Judge D.
Frank Wilkins, was heard on May 20, 1970. At that time,
the only evidence before the court was contained in the Affiof the defendants. Although the plaindavits filed on
tiff presented to the court at the time of said hearing a Reinstatement for plaintiff corporation ( R. 7 5), and it is believed that plaintiff's "Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss" ( R. 62-65) was also presented at the time
of said hearing, Rule 6 ( d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires opposing Affidavits to be served not lated than one
day before the hearing.
Therefore, it is submitted that the only facts to be considered by the court were those contained in the Affidavits
submitted by defendants. A summarization of those facts, in
chronological order, is as follows:
I. Norman Daniels is the supervisor of the Miscellaneous Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, and his
duties include the supervision over special fuel tax collections.
2. Prior to the incidents which precipitated the present
lawsuit, the plaintiff's history with the Tax Commission is
replete with failures to file required tax returns, failutes to post
required bonds, and returned and "bounced" checks which
were i55ued for payment of taxes.
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3. Plaintiff operated his trucks the entire year of 1968
without the special fuel permits which he was required by law
to obtain prior to the operation of his vehicles upon the roads
and highways of the State of Utah.
4. In March of 1968, at the insistence of the State Tax
Commission, plaintiff did post a $100 cash bond.
5. On February 17, 197 0, plaintiff applied for special
fuel permits for eight ( 8) vehicles, and permits were issued
for two ( 2) of those vehicles. Further, because of plaintiff's
history with the Tax Commission, the bond requirement was
increased from $100 to $500. Plaintiff agreed to furnish the
$500 bond and left a check for $500 which was to be used
for the bond if plaintiff did not promptly furnish a proper
corporate surety.
6. On March 2, 1970, the corporate charter of plaintiff's corporation was suspended for failure to pay its corporation franchise tax.
7. On March 3, 1970, the Tax Commission issued the
remaining six ( 6) permits to plaintiff, being unaware that
the corporate charter had been suspended the previous day and
having relied on the $500 check as sufficient security.
8. On approximately March 17, 1970, after waiting one
month for plaintiff to post a corporate surety, the Tax Commission deposited in the bank the $500 check which had been
left with them for a bond. Said check was dishonored and returned by plaintiff's bank.
9. On March 24, 1970, the first special fuel tax report
was due to be filed for the two permits which were issued to the
plaintiff on February 17, 1970. That report was not filed,
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and because of the failure to file, and, further, because of the
dishonoring of plaintiff's $500 check, the bond was increased
from $500 to $1,000. An Impound Order was then issued to
the Utah Highway Patrol by the Utah State Tax Commission,
and a member of the Highway Patrol called plaintiff and advised him of the Impound Order. An officer of plaintiff corporation then called Norman Daniels and asked him not to have
the Impound Order carried out and made additional promises
to meet the bond requirements.
Because of the additional promises made by plaintiff's president, Ronald C. Van Roosendaal, the Impound Order
was not carried out, but on April 10, 1970, more than two
weeks after the promises of plaintiff corporation's president
that the matters would be taken care of, the Impound Order
was carried out on one of the plaintiff's vehicles.
10.

11. Five days after the Impound Order, plaintiff filed
his first special fuel report, showing that 6,000 gallons of
special fuel had been consumed by plaintiff's vehicles.
12. The next day, on April 16, 1970, a Notice of Revocation of Special Fuel Permits for failure to post the required
bond was served on plaintiff, and plaintiff then filed his Complaint, Order to Show Cause, and other pleadings.
13. The following day, April 17, 1970, the revocation of
plaintiff's special fuel permits became effective.
14. On May 6, 1970, the Motion to Dismiss was_ filed
by the defendants, and on May 18, 1970, the plaintiff corporation was reinstated by the Utah Secretary of State.
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15. On May 20, 1970, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss was argued, and the Certificate of Reinstatement was filed
with the court, as it is believed was the Affidavit signed by
Ronald C. Van Roosendaal, the president of plaintiff, even
though the record reflects a much later date (March 23, 1971).

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF ARE IMMUNE
FROM PRIVATE SUIT BECAUSE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE "UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT."
The relevant portions of Section 63-30-10, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, provide, as follows:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of his employment except if the in1ury:

" ( 1) arises out of the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused, or

" ( 2 ) arises out of . . . a malicious prosecution,
intentional trespass, abuse of process, . . . invasion of
. . . civil rights, or
" ( 3) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension,
or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue,
deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization, or

*

* * * *
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" ( 5) arises out of the institution or prosecution
of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if
malicious or without probable cause, or

* * * * *

" ( 8) arises out of or in connection with the
collection of and assessment of taxes, . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
On page 14 of the appellant's Brief, it is admitted that
"the State of Utah and the State Tax Commission as a political
subdivision of the State of Utah could not be held liable for
the acts complained of."
The acts complained of are clearly a discretionary function
with the employees of the State Tax Commission, and this
court, in Velasquez v. Union Pacific RR Co., 24 U.2d 217,
469 P. 2d 5, affirmed the Summary Judgment of the lower
court in refusing to permit liability of a State political subdivision in the performance of a discretionary function. It is,
therefore, submitted that under the above statute, the facts
alleged in plaintiff's Complaint, and the Affidavits filed in the
lower court, there is no legal theory under which the State
of Utah, or the State Tax Commission, could possibly be liable
to the plaintiff.

If the plaintiff's theory of the case is that the acts of the
defendants constituted malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, or invasion of the plaintiff's civil rights,
subsection ( 2) of Section 63-30-10 would also eliminate any
possibility of liability on behalf of the State of Utah, or the
State Tax Commission.
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This action also arose in part out of the suspension and
revocation of plaintiff's special fuel permits, as is shown in
paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of defendant, Norman Daniels
( R. 45). It was not until after the revocation of said licenses
that defendant, Norman Daniels, issued the Impound Order
on plaintiff's trucks because said trucks were being operated
without the required special fuel permits. Therefore, any actions taken by a State employee as a result of the revocation
of a license are immune from suit because of the provisions of
subsection (3) of Section 63-30-10, supra.
Paragraph 21 of plaintiff's Complaint (R. 4-5) alleges
that the acts performed by the defendants were judicial functions, and if that allegation were true, then subsection ( 5) of
Section 63-30-10, s11pra, would prevent suit by plaintiff even
if the acts of defendants were "malicious or without probable
cause."
Finally, the acts complained of were in connection with
the collection of special fuel taxes, and subsection ( 8) of Section 63-30-10, supra, would make those acts immune from
suit. This provision is especially important because of the hostilities which are so often encountered by public employees
charged with the protection of public revenues.
Not only do the above provisions of Section 63-30-10,
Jupra, absolutely prohibit suit against the State of Utah and
the State Tax Commission, but there is no showing in the file,
nor is there an allegation in plaintiff's Complaint that the procedural requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act have
been complied with (Section 63-30-11 to 63-30-15).
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Therefore, because of the provisions of the Governmental
Immunity Act, it is respectfully submitted that there is no
possible basis for a recovery against the State of Utah or the
State Tax Commission, and Judge D. Frank Wilkins was correct in granting the Motion to Dismiss.

POINT

II

THE CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS OF
THE UTAH STA TE TAX COMMISSION COULD
NOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY AN EMPLOYEE OF THE TAX COMMISSION.
Even without the protective shield of the Governmental
Immunity Act, the only possible legal theory under which the
Chairman and Commissioners of the Utah State Tax Commission could be found liable to the plaintiff would be if
there were malice towards the plaintiff by the Chairman or
Commissioners.
Under Rule 12 (b), Utah Rules of Gvil Procedure, the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants could have been,
and probably was, treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. For purposes of such a Motion, the only matters
before Judge Wilkins were those which were set forth in the
Affidavits filed with defendants' Motion to Dismiss, because
under Rule 56 ( e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported '. . .
(by affidavits) an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Rule 56 ( e), supra, then continues and emphatically requires,
"If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him." Based on the facts set forth
in the Affidavits filed by defendants, in the absence of any
timely Affidavits from the plaintiff, Judge Wilkins had no
alternative but to grant the Motion to Dismiss. There was then
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and there were no
facts before Judge Wilkins which could have entitled the plaintiff to relief.
Further, even if Judge Wilkins did consider the untimely
Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ( R.
62-65), there would not have been a genuine issue as to any
material fact relating to the possible personal liability of the
Chairman and Commissioners of the Tax Commission. The
Affidavits of the Chairman and Commissioners ( R. 36-43)
clearly establish that they did not have any personal knowledge
of the transactions and occurrences between the plaintiff and
defendant, Norman Daniels, and it would have been impossible
for them to have been guilty of malice towards the plaintiff.
The Affidavit of plaintiff's president ( R. 62-65) does not even
allege any malice by the Chairman and Commissioners, nor
by, the Chairdoes it even allege any contact with, nor
man and Commissioners.
Based on the facts set forth in the Affidavits, the case of
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 U.2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968),
would preclude any liability in this case. In the opinion written
by Chief Justice Crockett, this court said:
"Upon our consideration of the various aspects
of the problem and an examination of the authorities
which have dealt with it, it is our opinion that in a
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situation such as this, where one inmate has injured
another, the warden and other prison officers are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity against
claims of negligence so long as they are acting in good
faith and within the scope of their duties, and that
they could not be held liable unless they were guilty
of some conduct which transcended the bounds of good
faith performance of their duty by a wilful or malicious
wrongful act which they know or should know would
result in injury." (Emphasis added.)
The Affidavits before Judge Wilkins did not show any
possibility that any actions by the Chairman and Commissioners "transcended the bounds of good faith'', and it is therefore
respectfully submitted that they could not have been personally
liable to the plaintiff and the ruling of Judge Wilkins was
correct.

POINT

III

PUBLIC OFFICERS ARE NOT LIABLE IN A
PRIVATE ACTION FOR GOOD FAITH ACTS
PERFORMED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR
AUTHORITY.
The courts are unanimous in their decisions that a public
officer is not liable in a private action for acts performed in
good faith within the scope of his authority. 67 C.J.S., Officers,
Section 125 et seq., Utah law conforms to this general law as
has been shown above by the citation from Sheffield v. Turner,
supra. Also, see Sehy v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 535, 125
P. 691, 42 LR.A., N.S., 915.
In Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d ( 1965), 129 at 131, (1st

Cir. 196 5 ) , the court said:
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"A long line of decisions has, both before and
since, recognized that in many instances the protection
of the public interest by shielding responsible government officers against the harassment and inevitable
hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits based
on acts done in the exercise of their official responsibilities 'outweighs the protection of the individual
citizen against damage caused by oppressive or malicious action on the part of public officers'." (Emphasis
added.)
As Chief Judge Learned Hand said in Gregoire v. Biddle,
et al., 177 F.2d 579 (2nd Cir. 1949), Cert. Den. 339 U.S. 949,
70S Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed 1963, at page 581:
"The justification (for denying recovery}
. is
that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well
founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to
the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of
its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the
most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties."
In Kelley v. Dunne, supra, at 132-133, the court set forth
the following common denominators in disallowing private
suits against public officers:

The conduct of the defendant-official was within the
scope of agency powers.
1.

2. The act complained of was prima facie in accordance
with the officers' duties and customary behavior.
3.

The free exercise of the public function outweighed

private mterests.

12

This case clearly fits the standards set forth in that case
for governmental immunity.
The conduct of the defendants was within the scope of
the powers and duties of the Tax Commission, because they
must administer the special fuel tax laws, including the issuance
and revocation of licenses, setting the bonding requirements,
and keeping vehicles off of the highways if they do not have
the proper permits, either by failing to obtain permits or by
having them revoked.
The actions of Norman Daniels were prima facie in accordance with his duties and customary behavior. He was the
supervisor of the Division charged with the collection of special
fuel taxes and any bonds required to be posted therefor. He
had experienced many persistent problems in attempting to
encourage plaintiff to comply with the special fuel tax laws of
the State of Utah. He had made many endeavors to make some
arrangement for plaintiff to comply with said laws, and after
continually being ignored by plaintiff and after the continual
failure of plaintiff to comply with the promises made, the defendant, Norman Daniels, had no alternative but to use more
aggressive methods to collect the taxes and bond due to the
State of Utah. Every action taken by the defendant, Norman
Daniels, was in accordance with his duties of insuring compliance with the special fuel tax laws of the State of Utah, as is
set forth in his Affidavit ( R. 4 7) , as follows:
"Affiant further states, under oath, that every act
which he performed in connection with the above
named case was done in good faith and without any
malice or wrongful intent or any intent other than his
desire to fulfill his administrative duty, to collect the
tax and bond which were just and legal obligations due
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to the State of Utah, and that each and every act performed was his best judgment as to the best and correct
way to fulfill his administrative duty and to collect the
tax and bond due to the State of Utah, and was his
understanding that said procedure was the legal and
correct method of fulfilling his duties."
In this case, the free exercise of the public function clearly
outweighs the private interests. The defendants are charged
with administering the tax laws of the State of Utah, a most
necessary but sometimes unpleasant assignment, and the protection of public moneys must always be their paramount consideration. Filing tax returns and paying taxes is not highly
anticipated under the best of circumstances, and it can seem
excessively oppressive to any taxpayer who is unfamiliar with
the tax laws, does not have the money with which to pay taxes
due, or is just rebellious and refuses to pay; but for whatever
reason a taxpayer has not complied with the tax laws, more
aggressive methods must be used to insure compliance with
those laws, and when those more aggressive methods are used,
the taxpayer will frequently feel that the whole world is against
him; that the Tax Commission is not sympathetic with his
problems, or that it is a personal act of malice by a particular
individual. Nevertheless, such feelings have been created by a
public servant attempting to perform his duty as he understood it. To impose personal liability on a public servant in
such circumstances would clearly be a deterrent to his future
duties of protecting the public moneys, and it was specifically
for that reason that Section 63-30-10, supra. was enacted to
prottct the State. For these reasons, the free exercise of the public function clearly outweighs the private interests.
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The Montana Supreme Court has followed this line of
reasoning and has held that immunity from personal liability
is not extended to the official for his own sake, but because
the public interest requires full independence of action and
decision on his part, uninfluenced by any fear or apprehension
of consequences personal to himself. Meinecke v. McFarland,
206 P.2d 1012 at 1014 (1949).
One of the best statements of the rule of law which speaks
against the plaintiff in the instant case is in Lipman v Brisbane
Elementary School Dist., S.C. of California, 359 P.2d 465, at
467 (1961):
"Because of important policy considerations, the
rule has become established that government officials
are not personally liable for their discretionary actS
within the scope of their authority even though it is
alleged that their conduct was malicious. (Citations
omitted.) The subjection of officials, the innocent as
well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the
danger of its outcome would impair their zeal in the
performance of their functions, and it is better to leave
the injury unredressed than to subject honest officials
to the constant dread of retaliation." (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court recently considered this problem when construction of a junior high school resulted in destruction of an irrigation ditch and landowners in Utah's Granite School District instituted suit against the school district and
the individual board members. The defendants' Motion to
Dismiss was granted by the Third District Court, and the Supreme Court affirmed:
"In common with other public officials, they
[school board members} have authority to do whatever
is reelsonably necessary in carrying out the duties imposed upon them. It would be quite impractical and
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unfair to require them to act at their own risk. This
would not only be disruptive of the proper functioning of public institutions, but undoubtedly would dissuade competent and responsible persons from accepting responsibilities of public office. Accordingly, it is
the settled policy of the law that when a public official
acts in good faith, believing what he does to be within
the scope of his authority and in the line of his dttty,
he is not liable for damages even if he makes a mistake
in the exercise of his judgment." (Emphasis added.)
Anderson v. Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d 405,
4U P.2d 597 ( 1969) at 599. Citing: Roe i·. Lundstrom . 89
Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1128 ( 1936).

The case at hand appears to be one of the specific type
for which the rule is intended, i.e., to permit any possibility
of personal liability would be disruptive to the proper functioning of the State Tax Commission and would definitely dissuade competent and responsible persons from accepting the
responsibilities of public off ice and would further dissuade
such public officers from using their best efforts in the performance of their duties. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted
that Judge D. Frank Wilkins was correct in granting the Motion to Dismiss.
POINT

IV

THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT AVOID THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT AL IMMUNITY BY
SUING A PUBLIC OFFICER IN A PR IV ATE
SUIT.
The doctrine named above in Point Ill, that a public
officer is not liable for his good faith acts performed within
the scope of his authority, is a form of the common-law doc16

trine of sovereign immunity. That doctrine, of course, prevents
any private suit against the State or Federal governments without the consent of the government to be sued. However, many
attempts have been made to circumvent this rule by bringing
the action against the individual, employee, or public official
to indirectly achieve what could not be achieved directly. Because of this, the courts subsequently adopted the doctrine
that the impact of governmental immunity could not be avoided by bringing the suit against the employee or public official
in his individual capacity. This principal and the reasons therefore are well explained in 160 A.LR. 332 at 333, wherein it
says:
"However, while a suit against state or Federal
officials is not necessarily a suit against the state, within the rule of immunity of the state from suit without
its consent, that rule cannot be evaded by bringing
an action nominally against an officer or a board, commission, or department in his or its official capacity
when the real claim is against the sovereign itself, who
is the party vitally interested . . . . While formerly, in
determining whether a state was a party to controversy,
the court would look only to the record to see who
were the parties, that is, the court would not consider
the state a party unless nominally so, this view has
long since been discarded. The rule is now well settled
that a suit against an officer as representing the sovereign in action and liability, where the state, although
not a party to the record, is the real party against which
relief is sought, and where a judgment for the plaintiff, although nominally against the officer as an individual, could operate to control the action of the state
or subject it to liability, is to be deemed a suit against
the state, and is not maintainable unless the state has
consented to be sued."
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The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed this principle in Sheffield v. Turner, 21 U.2d 314, 44 5 P.2d 367
( 1968), which was a private action against the warden of the
Utah State Prison by an inmate who had been stabbed by a
fellow prisoner. The complaint alleged that the warden ha<l
permitted his employees to supervise the inmates in a negligent
manner, which enabled the fellow prisoner to enter the plaintiff's quarters and stab him. Justice Crockett wrote the opinion
of the Utah Supreme Court and stated:
"The anciently established and almost universally
recognized general rule which this court has consistently announced and adhered to is that the government,
its agencies and officials performing governmental
functions are protected by sovereign immunity." (Emphasis added.)
The authorities cited by the Court for that statement were:
''Sehy v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 535, 125 P. 691,
42 L.R.A., N.S., 915; Bingham v. Board of Education
of Ogden City, 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 423; Niblock
v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800; Spring·
t'ille Bankinf{ Co .. t'. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349
P.2d 157."

The Court did delve into the question of whether the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (Sec. 63-30-1, et seq., Utah
Code Ann., 195 3), had any influence on the above-stated principles and cases, but the Court finally concluded, at page 369:
"Upon our consideration of the various aspects
of the problem and an examination of the authorities
which have dealt with it, it is our opinion that in a
situation such as this, . . . the warden and other prison
officers are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity af{ainst claims of negligence so long as they are
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acting in good faith and within the scope of their duties,
and that they could not be held liable unless they were
guilty of some conduct which transcended the bounds
of good faith performance of their duty by a wilful or
malicious wrongful act which they knew or should
know would result in injury."
The Court indicated that the reason for its holding was
"the imperative need for those in a supervisory capacity to
have reasonable freedom to discharge (their) burdensome responsibilities . . . . If such officials are too vulnerable to lawsuits for anything, . . . capable persons would be discouraged
from taking such public positions." Id. at 369.
The above reasons are also clearly present m the case
at hand, and it is respectfully submitted that the Court should
hold similarly to Sheffield v. Turner, supra.

POINT

V

THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION MAY NOT
BRING THIS ACTION BECAUSE OF THE SUSPENSION OF ITS CORPORATE POWERS.
At the time plaintiff filed its Complaint, its corporate
powers had been suspended by the Utah Secretary of State
under the provisions of Section 59-13-61, Utah Code Annotated, 195 3, which reads, in part, as follows:
"If a tax computed and levied hereunder is not
paid . . . the corporate powers, rights and privileges
of the delinquent taxpayer, if it is a domestic corporation, shall be suspended, and if a foreign corporation,
it shall thereupon forfeit its rights to do intrastate business in this state.
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"The suspension or forfeiture herein provided for
shall become effective from the time such record is
made, and the certificate of the secretary of state shall
be prima-facie evidence of such suspension or forfeiture."
Immediately following that prov1s10n, Section 59-13-62,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides, in part:
"Any person who attempts or purports to exercise
any of the rights, privileges or powers of any such
domestic corporation, or who transacts or attempts to
transact any intrastate business in this state in behalf
of any such foreign corporation, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less
than $250 and not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than fifty days or more
than five hundred days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. . . . . Every contract made in violation
of this section is unenforceable by such corporation or
person."
Section 59-13-63, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
for the issuance of a Certificate of Revivor and reinstatement
of the corporation rights, privileges and powers after they have
been suspended. The defendants do not dispute that such a
Certificate of Revivor had been issued at the time of the hearing on defendants' Motion to Dismiss, nor does the plaintiff
dispute that the corporation's rights, privileges and powers had
been suspended at the time of the filing of the Complaint in
this action as well as at the time when plaintiff was still carrying on business when defendant, Norman Daniels, issued the
Impound Order on plaintiff's vehicles. It is respectfully submitted that the relevant times in this case are the time when
the Complaint was filed and the time when the actions complained of occurred, and that the time of hearing the Motion
to Dismiss is immaterial for purposes of this argument.
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The plaintiffs Brief cites the cases of M & S Construction
and Engineering Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 U.2d 139,
467 P.2d 410, and Mackay and Knobel Enterprises, Inc. v.
Teton Van Gas, Inc., 23 U.2d 200, 460 P.2d 828, for the proposition that a suspended corporation still has full authority to
bring any action in the courts of this State. However, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court did not intend
those cases to receive such a broad interpretation.
In the case of Mackay and Knobel Enterprises, Inc. v.
Teton Van Gas, Inc., supra, the plaintiff corporation was in
good standing at the time of filing its Complaint but was thereafter suspended for failure to pay its corporate franchise taxes.
The district court then dismissed the action on the ground that
the plaintiff corporation lacked the legal capacity to maintain
the suit, and this court reversed that decision. It should also be
pointed out that the acts of which the plaintiff complained
had apparently occurred prior to the suspension of the plaintiffs rights, powers and privileges. Therefore, the claim of the
plaintiff against the defendants would have been a valid claim
at the time of said suspension and attempting to reach a settlement of that claim was merely a portion of "winding up" the
affairs of the corporation.
In the case of M & S Construction and Engineering Co. v.
Clearfield State Bank, supra, the district court had again dismissed an action in which the cause of action had arisen and a
Complaint had been filed before the suspension of the plaintiff corporation's powers, rights and privilege, and it is suggested that this was another case where the action was a necessary ingredient for "winding up" the affairs of the corporation.
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In the case at hand, the acts complained of, an<l the filing
of the Complaint all occurred after the suspension of all corporate rights, powers and privileges. At those times, the plaintiff's rights, powers and privileges had all been suspended and
it had no right whatever to be operating a business within the
State of Utah. There simply was no legal corporate entity in
existence to which the defendants could have caused any damage or injury. If there were no corporation in existence, how
can the plaintiff claim that this "ghost" corporation was mjured?
It is not contended here that either the Aiackay case or
the ,If & S Construction case, supra, reached the wrong conclusion. A careful reading of those cases clearly discloses that
they were both in the process of "winding up" the affairs of
the corporation in bringing those actions in court. In both of
those cases the causes of action had arisen prior to the suspension of the corporate rights, powers and privileges, and also
both of the Complaints were filed prior to such suspensions.

What is being suggested here is that after the corporate
rights, powers and privileges have been suspended, a corporation may not then bring an action in the courts of this State
for a cause of action which arose because of the active continuing conduct of the corporation's business after the suspension of all corporate rights, especially when the conduct of
business constitutes a criminal offense. To rule otherwise would
be to grant a suspended corporation all of the protective corporate rights, powers and privileges without any of the attendant
responsibilities which attach to individuals who elect to do
business under the protective shell of a corporate entity.
The interpretation of the law suggested here is in conformity with current statutory and case law.
22

Section 16-10-101, Utah Code Annotated, reads:
"Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation
. . . the corporate existence of such corporation shall
nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up
its affairs in respect to any property and assets which
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and exercise
all other incidental and necessary powers." (Emphasis
added.)
That statute does not give dissolved corporations the right
to continue business for all purposes, but only for the purpose
of winding up its affairs.
In the case of Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n.
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 U.2d 366, 325 P.2d
899, at p. 375 this Court held:
"The logical conclusion . . . is that 59-13-61
would not prevent Felt from bringing suit to enforce
the rights growing out of business transacted while it
was franchised here, even though its franchise had been
revoked, . . ."
Also, in the case of Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water
and Power Co., 55 Utah 393, 187 P.174, at p. 399; 47 A.L.R.
1282, this Court emphasized the importance of the distinctions
between actions to wind up the affairs of a corporation, and
actions to further the regular business of a corporation when
it said:
"Whatever may have been Mr. Whitney's purpose, his acts were designed and calculated not to wind
up the affairs of the company, but to enlarge and extend its field of operation. To contend that these transactions had any tendency to close or wind up the busi23

ness affairs of the Utah corporation is a mere juggle
with words. It is utterly fallacious to say that a corporation by its corporate death is given everlasting
corporate life; that a defunct corporation is endowed
by law with enlarged and limitless powers, and that
it may enter into realms of speculation from which it
was excluded while it had full corporate existence .....
If the theory plausibly presented by appellants is tenable, a private corporation in this state desiring to enlarge and extend its powers may have its charter forfeited by failing to pay its annual state corporation license tax and then become a law unto itself, engage in
any kind of business that may suit the fancy of its
officers, and become a buccaneer on the high seas of finance. Such is not the purpose of the law. The evidence
shows that the president of the respondent corporation
was in 191 1 given power by the board of directors to
borrow money and execute notes and mortgages, and it
is claimed that under those resolutions, which were
never rescinded, he had authority to execute the notes
and mortgages sued upon. How an authority conferred
during the lifetime of a corporation can be invoked as
a justification for its acts after its corporate death, and
while lingering only for the purpose of being wound
up, is a question that is answered by its mere statement.
Whatever authority the president of the corporation
had by virtue of the resolution of the board of directors
died with the corporation, and the fact that the officer
could do those things necessary to wind up the affairs
of the corporation does not justify the assumption that
he had the power and authority that may possibly have
vested in him before the charter of the corporation was
forfeited."
In that case, this Court also cited with approval 8 Fletcher's Cyc. Corp., Section 5572, which reads:
"It is hardly necessary to state that a corporation
which has been dissolved cannot continue business as
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a going concern. This is so, even though a statute continues its existence for a definite or indefinite time to
wind up the business."
This Court also said in that case:
"Where a corporation's charter is forfeited in this
state, it is the duty of the directors, who are trustees
for the stockholders and creditors, to assemble its assets, liquidate its indebtedness, and generally conduct
its affairs in such manner as will properly expedite the
winding up of the corporation's business. No such
course was pursued in this case."
It is respectfully submitted that Judge D. Frank Wilkins
was correct in dismissing the action on the grounds that the
corporate powers of plaintiff corporation had been suspended
which suspended all of the powers, rights and privileges of said
corporation. It is apparent that Judge Wilkins determined the
actions of plaintiff corporation to be outside its authority to

wind-up its affairs.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that Judge D. Frank Wilkins
was correct in granting the Motion to Dismiss of the defendants for the reasons stated in the Order, and it is, therefore,
urged that said decision be affirmed with costs to the appel-

lant.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
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